

# Risks of Unmanaged Encrypted Environments to Critical National Infrastructures



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*Founder and CEO*

SSH Communications Security



ssh® is a registered  
trademark of SSH  
Communications  
Security

- Developed and published the original Secure Shell as free software in 1995
- Founded SSH Communications Security Corp in 1995
- CEO and controlling shareholder for SSH Communications Security
- Long-term entrepreneur
- Deeply involved in development of solutions for large SSH environments for both commercial SSH products and OpenSSH



# SSH Communications Security

- Founded in 1995
- Listed on NASDAQ OMX Helsinki (SSH1V)
- 50+ patents in various countries in cybersecurity
- Leading provider of solutions based on SSH protocol
- Over 3,000 customers worldwide - including 7 of the Fortune 10 and 40% of Fortune 500



- = SSH Office
- = SSH Competence Center



# Birth of Secure Shell (SSH)

- I was a researcher at Helsinki University of Technology, when the university network was hacked in early 1995, and passwords were stolen with a password-sniffing attack
- To prevent such attacks, I developed the **Secure Shell** protocol suite to replace the unsecured telnet, ftp, rlogin and rcp tools
- The first version of the SSH protocol was released to the Internet community in July 1995
- By the end of 1995, SSH had 20,000 users in 50 countries
- By year 2000, SSH had estimated 2 million users
- Today, it is widely used globally by enterprises, government agencies, research institutions and universities to secure sensitive network traffic both within and between networks.



# Where is Secure Shell Used Today?


- SSH protocol is widely used
  - by system administrators
  - in automated machine-to-machine processes
- SSH protocol is used
  - on every Unix/Linux computer
  - in most cloud computing environments
  - in more than half of the world's web sites
  - in most xDSL modems, routers, telecom exchanges and other network equipment.
- SSH protocol has been in use since 1995 and is used widely today
- SSH protocol is still secure
- But the way organizations are handling keys for user authentication is not





# Secure Shell Authentication Keys

- A Key pair, consisting of a private and public key
  - Private Key is an “Identity Key”. It validates identity of the person or process requesting login.
  - Public Key is an “Authorized Key”. Establishes what level of access is granted to the holder(s) of the Private/Identity Key.
- Keys are used for automated processes
  - Enables authentication for scheduled and automated file transfers and other tasks where user interaction is not possible
- Keys are used for interactive connections
  - Private key can be protected with a passphrase





# Explosion of Machine Identities

20%  
Human Identities

Centralized directory services for  
standard end users

80%  
Machine Identities


Little to no centralized management and activity  
monitoring over privileged users and machine  
based identities



- Not knowing who can access what
- Not knowing who is accessing what
- Bypassing privileged access management systems
- Adding an authorized key to hide a backdoor
- Unintended non-file-transfer access by business partner (missing command restriction)
- Undocumented Cross-Environment Connections:
  - Development/Testing -> Production, low impact->high impact, non-PCI->PCI
- Lacking effective termination of access when employee leaves
- Quick attack spread once inside perimeter (malware, APT) – SERIOUS!
- Many organizations cannot practically change keys even after breach
- Lack of compliance with government/industry regulations (e.g., PCI)







- Most organizations have on the average 8 to 100+ SSH keys configured granting access to each Unix/Linux server
- These keys often grant high level administrative access
- The mesh of key-based access is so dense that it is highly likely that an attack can spread to nearly all servers in an organization
- Risks increase substantially if the APT also utilizes other attack vectors to escalate privileges to “root” (high-level administrator) after penetrating a server

- A Major Financial Institution
  - Over 10,000 servers on their network
  - 1.5 million keys identified
  - 10% or 150,000 keys HAD ROOT ACCESS
  - Failed Monetary Authority of Singapore and SOX Audits
  - Now working with SSH on key remediation project



## Former Hostgator employee arrested, charged with rooting 2,700 servers

Prosecutors: Backdoor and digital key gave him near unfettered access.

by Dan Goodin - Apr 19 2013, 7:51pm FLEDT

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## GitHub users warned over security risk

Search tool on programming site turns up SSH keys, which could allow attackers to hack sites or alter programs silently

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### Hackers break into two FreeBSD Project servers using stolen SSH keys

Users who installed third-party software packages distributed by FreeBSD.org are advised to reinstall their machines

By Lucian Constantin

November 19, 2012 08:29 AM ET 3 Comments

EXPOSED ROOT SSH KEY WAS SHIPPING WITH EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM DEVICES

by Michael Mimoso Follow @mike\_mimoso


July 8, 2013, 5:18 pm



# Standardization Initiatives

- **PCI DSS 3.0** requires addressing SSH key based access in many ways (e.g., scope includes any system having security impact on cardholder data) – Compliance Kit at <http://pages.ssh.com/pci3.html>
- **Monetary Authority of Singapore Technology Risk Management Guidelines** require managing SSH key based access (e.g. Development/Testing -> Production) – see whitepaper at <http://pages.ssh.com/mas.html>
- **US Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX)** requires controlling who can access financial data
- **US FISMA** and **NIST SP 800-53** require managing SSH keys in numerous ways (NIST Interagency Report coming out very soon!)
- **US FERC/NERC CIP** rules require controlling who can configure critical infrastructure
- **US HIPAA** requires controlling who can access patient data
- **IETF draft-ylonen-sshkeybcp-01.txt** provides best practice guidelines (pending update!)
- Most regulatory standards are written technology-agnostic, and don't mention SSH by name – but keys provide system-level access

1. Establish controlled key provisioning process
2. Remediate existing legacy keys
3. Establish continuous monitoring and management of keys, for both automated and interactive access







## 1. Establish Controlled Key Provisioning Process

- Enforce approvals for all new key creation
  - Access provisioning should be on need basis and auditable
- Move authorized keys to root-owned location
  - Prevent easy bypass of approval process and arbitrary access delegation
- Automate provisioning of approved key requests
  - Cost savings, security, less errors
- Document purpose and owner of each authorized key
  - Cannot audit and terminate keys if purpose is not known; need to know which person to ask about key
- Enforce command restrictions on keys
  - Limit attack spread by malware / APT



- **Discover keys and monitor use**
  - Monitor key usage to determine which keys are actually being used and from where
- **Reduce number of keys**
  - Eliminate keys that are never used
  - Eliminate policy or boundary violating keys (e.g. Development -> Production)
  - Must always have a back-off option in case a key is critical for business!
- **Identify business purpose and owner for remaining keys**
  - Collect approvals from application teams
  - Record purpose, owner, and approval for compliance and maintenance
  - Eliminate keys for which no business purpose can be found
- **Add restrictions to remaining keys**
  - Prevent malware or Advance Persistent Threat (APT) spread




## 3. Monitor and Manage Keys Continuously

- **Monitor syslog for key access activity and scan hosts to find keys**
  - Immediate alerts on unauthorized keys and unauthorized key-based access
- **Implement periodic key rotation**
  - Ensures eventual termination of access by copied keys
    - Very important after breach!
- **Implement privileged access auditing also for key-based access**
  - Keys intended for automation may be used by people!
  - Prevent bypass of privileged access auditing
  - Detect attacks using keys early



# Solution Approach: Centralized SSH Access Management



**Centralized database:**

-Repository of all configuration and key information

**Backend:**

-Host connectivity  
- Job execution

**Management Agent:**

- Connectivity in Agent-based deployment

**Frontend:**

-Web-based graphical user Interface for configuration and reporting  
- API integration point for configuration and reporting


**UserPortal:**

-Web-based portal for end users, application owners etc.  
-External key import for external keys/ users  
-Access request/removal/restriction enforcement signoffs and approval processes



# Security Paradox: Security vs. Visibility


- Encrypted remote system access and data transfers of an enterprise:
  - Internal to Internal
  - Internal to External
  - External to Internal
- Encryption means NO visibility to the actual content of the traffic
- How to trace and audit user commands and activities?
- How to inspect and analyze incoming and outgoing data flows?





# Solution Approach: Trusted and Transparent Audit Point

- Inline, agentless and invisible on-the-fly capture
- Centralized management, reporting and encrypted audit trail storage
- Audit point can be deployed as virtual or hardware appliance
- Audit and replay connections exactly as they happened
- Real-time content based indexing, searches and reporting
- Preventative channel and content controls
- Integration to DLP, IPS, SIEM
- Minimally invasive: No changes to user experience, processes or environment



- Most organizations with large Unix/Linux environments have a serious security and compliance problem with unmanaged authorized keys
- The scope and impact of the issue is not yet very widely understood
- Knowing who can access what systems and information is critical for information security – without it you don't have confidentiality, integrity or continuity
- It is about access, not cryptographic algorithms or sizes
- For more information:
  - <http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ylonen-sshkeybcp-01.txt>



Questions?

[www.ssh.com](http://www.ssh.com)



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